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Abstract 
There is consistent evidence showing that driver behaviour contributes to crashes and near 
miss incidents at railway level crossings (RLXs). The development of emerging Vehicle-to-
Vehicle and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure technologies is a highly promising approach to improve 
RLX safety. To date, research has not evaluated comprehensively the potential effects of 
such technologies on driving behaviour at RLXs. This paper presents an on-going research 
programme assessing the impacts of such new technologies on human factors and drivers‟ 
situational awareness at RLX. Additionally, requirements for the design of such promising 
technologies and ways to display safety information to drivers were systematically reviewed. 
Finally, a methodology which comprehensively assesses the effects of in-vehicle and road-
based interventions warning the driver of incoming trains at RLXs is discussed, with a focus 
on both benefits and potential negative behavioural adaptations.  The methodology is 
designed for implementation in a driving simulator and covers compliance, control of the 
vehicle, distraction, mental workload and drivers‟ acceptance. This study has the potential to 
provide a broad understanding of the effects of deploying new in-vehicle and road-based 
technologies at RLXs and hence inform policy makers on safety improvements planning for 
RLX.   
Keywords: Railway Level Crossings; Intelligent Transport Systems; Human Machine 
Interface 
1. Introduction 
Crashes at railway level crossings (RLXs) in Australia between 2001 and 2008 resulted in 
342 fatalities (43 each year on average), 605 collisions (76 each year on average) and $32 
million in costs each year (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2010). Collisions at actively 
protected crossings account for two-thirds of all costs (Cairney, 2003), suggesting that there 
is a need to improve safety at both actively and passively protected level crossings. 
Vehicle-related and environment-related factors are not commonly used to provide 
explanation for a level crossing collision in isolation of driver-related factors. Driver-related 
factors are involved in most collisions at level crossings. These factors are mainly a result of 
driver errors rather than driver impairment. More specifically, unintentional errors are more 
common than intentional violations: failure to detect the crossing and/or the train, and 
misjudgements regarding the approaching train‟s speed and distance (Abraham et al., 1998, 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2002). 
The most severe crashes at RLXs are often due to driver misjudgements of the amount of 
free space available after the crossing. In high traffic, one vehicle can trap another vehicle 
on the crossing. However, the blocking back issue can only occur when there is sufficient 
traffic to cause a queue. This issue is therefore irrelevant to passive crossings, which are 
characterised by low traffic volumes. Blocking back is a contributing factor to crashes at 
RLXs, as drivers may make the decision to cross when the signal is not activated although 
there is no space available to complete the crossing. It has been observed in the UK that a 
third of the driver population is likely to trap the vehicle in front on the crossing. Moreover, 
such a situation is quite frequent and not confined to offenders (McKenzie-Kerr et al., 2011). 
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Both age and familiarity with the railway crossing have also been found to influence the risk 
associated with driving on RLXs. Recent research suggests that drivers aged 60 years and 
over have impairments that can directly affect their driving at RLXs such as difficulties 
adjusting to glare and night-time driving, restricted range of motion to the neck and 
substantial declines in hearing (Wallace, 2008). A further problem among older drivers is the 
association between familiarity and unsafe driving practices. Research suggests that many 
older drivers are unaware that what would normally constitute a risky driving situation (such 
as a complex intersection) has become specifically risky for them (Holland and Rabbitt, 
1992). Given that older people constitute the fastest growing sector of the driving population, 
and that they exhibit a higher crash rate per distance travelled, this group requires particular 
attention. 
Novice drivers (aged 17-24 years) are another group that requires specific attention at RLXs.  
Recent research indicates that young drivers, particularly males, have low levels of self-
efficacy when it comes to driving at level crossings.  Self-efficacy relates to individual‟s 
capacity to organise, control and execute certain behaviours to attain specific performances 
(Sheeran et al., 2003). It relies on the accuracy of an individual‟s perception of their control 
of the behaviour. With Wallace's (2008) study indicating low levels of self-efficacy among 
younger drivers at RLXs and the results from research suggesting that a high level of self-
efficacy is required to obtain greater success of behavioural change (Wells-Parker et al., 
2000), it appears that younger drivers, especially males and those with low-self efficacy, are 
particularly in need of the use of infrastructure or warning systems, where possible, as 
educational interventions are likely to have a low rate of success. 
It has been reported in an Australian survey that 20% of 4,400 drivers had become aware of 
a RLX only after they had crossed it (Sochon, 2008). It is important that the road user 
detects the presence of the crossing early enough in order to define and implement a 
strategy for safely approaching and crossing the railway. New Intelligent Transport Systems 
(ITS) can help to increase driver awareness as they approach RLXs. Such systems should 
only be used when trains are arriving at a RLX, as otherwise they could irritate drivers with 
numerous warning signals, even when no risk of collision is present. This issue is even 
worse for drivers who cross a particular crossing regularly. Therefore this project focuses on 
assessing the effects of such new ITS to increase drivers‟ awareness as they approach 
RLXs. The aim is to evaluate driver compliance as well as driver acceptance and perceived 
usefulness of new technologies when approaching RLXs. Drivers‟ errors at RLXs underscore 
the importance of making the crossing salient, and therefore this paper will first introduce the 
requirements of new ITS interventions for improving driver awareness around crossings. 
Emerging technologies are then reviewed in order to highlight the potential for new 
interventions at RLXs. Such interventions need to follow good practice in terms of human 
factors, particularly Human Machine Interface (HMI), and this is discussed in the following 
section. Finally, a methodology to assess the effects such interventions is provided. This 
methodology focuses on evaluating compliance, control of vehicle, distraction and driver 
acceptance of the technology. 
2. Requirements for improving awareness around RLXs 
The National Road Safety Action Plan 2009 and 2010 affirms that Australian State and 
Territory governments have adopted a safe systems approach as a core measure to improve 
road safety, while the Draft Rail Safety National Law 2011 attempts to harmonise rail safety 
in all States of Australia.  The approach recognises that collective responsibilities of different 
parties are needed to effectively improve road safety, including infrastructure providers, 
infrastructure managers, transport regulators and road users. The stakeholders to consider 
for improving the specific issue of safety at RLXs are rail regulators, rail industry and 
operators and road users. Each of them has different needs and expectations in regards to 
the development of ITS interventions, which are presented in the following sections.  
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2.1. Rail Regulators 
The National Railway Level Crossing Safety Strategy 2010-2020 describes approaches for 
improving the safety of Australia‟s land transport system. Rail regulators aim to reduce the 
number of crashes and associated costs at RLXs. With more than 1500 passive crossings 
throughout Queensland alone, and given that collisions are distributed across thousands of 
RLXs throughout the national network, it is difficult to justify the installation of expensive 
active protection systems which have a low likelihood of a collision. Alternatively, there are 
affordable solutions, such as ITS interventions, that can be used to reduce driver errors. 
These interventions may not only save lives but also be much more beneficial financially by 
avoiding major infrastructure damage, environmental disaster, and potential delays in the rail 
network. Potential undesirable consequences of new technologies should also be 
investigated during the development stage. Hence the proposed methodology of this project 
will evaluate whether reducing the difficulty of driving through a RLX with ITS technology will 
result in a reduction of driver errors, while consideration will also be given to the potential 
negative behavioural that may arise.  
2.2. Rail Industry and Operators 
The responsibility for rail safety in Australia is shared by the government and rail industry 
under a co-regulatory approach. Industry is “responsible for addressing risks to safety by 
identifying and implementing the most effective and efficient solutions via their safety 
management systems, and achieving required safety outcomes'' (Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, 2010). The needs of rail industry and operators have been investigated 
though consultations with the following rail industry bodies and operators: Queensland Rail, 
Queensland Transport, Department of Transport and Main Roads, VicTrack, Australian Rail 
Track Corporation (ARTC), Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board. ARTC estimates that 
the costs associated with improving a level crossing should be no more than $50k in order to 
be financially sustainable. This estimation takes into account the fact that there is a limited 
budget to upgrade the large number of passively protected level crossings in Australia. 
Currently, potential low-cost train detection systems range from $100k to $150k. 
2.3. Road Users 
Driver errors are the main contributing factor to crashes at RLXs. Driver errors are mainly 
due to failure in detecting the crossing, failure to detect the train (e.g., due to complacency), 
and misjudgement regarding the speed and distance of an approaching train. Drivers need 
assistive information that will increase their situational awareness. This enables them to 
perceive, understand, and accurately foresee forthcoming dangerous situations with enough 
time to safely avoid these situations. Compliance would be attained only if there are high 
levels of driver acceptability of railway level crossing warning devices. Compliance is largely 
contingent on the perceived credibility of the warning device, and perceived credibility 
requires a highly reliable device. Therefore ITS interventions must be designed to avoid 
over-reliance (drivers still need to check for trains) and the message conveyed to drivers 
must follow principles that safeguard against mental overload and distraction. 
3. Emergent technologies 
A range of new and affordable technologies are rapidly emerging and these represent a 
potentially effective approach to improving driver detection of RLXs and trains. A number of 
technologies are currently being implemented or trialled for the purposes of RLX safety, 
including: in-vehicle warning systems (e.g. collision avoidance systems), dynamic warning 
signals (e.g. advanced variable message warning signs and second-train warning signals), 
automated photo and video enforcement, obstacle detection systems and alternative low-
cost train detection systems. In-vehicle warning messages and supplementary road-based 
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warning signals have the potential to provide information about the crossing and 
approaching trains and hence are likely to improve driver awareness at crossings.  
The evolution of ITS may complement or replace current RLX systems. Integrated Vehicle 
Based Safety Systems and Dedicated Short Range Communication systems, for example, 
are beginning to appear in new vehicles and, when coupled to Communication based Train 
Control systems and enhanced Driver Vehicles Interfaces, would place the level crossing 
protection system inside the vehicle rather than on the wayside. While it will likely take 
several decades for this to be fully realised, there is a high probability that any new level 
crossing protection system will not enjoy the lifespan of its predecessors. 
Many railways currently face the challenge of providing better and safer RLXs while 
maintaining affordable operational costs. Using wireless technologies is a cost-effective 
solution likely to allow deployment of new interventions without having to invest in costly 
cables. Wireless communications have recently been considered by the rail industry as 
generally able to perform multiple functions, such as monitoring, traffic control and vital 
information such as signalling (SELCAT, 2008). 
Considering possibilities of data transmission, two different classes of communication can be 
found. The first class corresponds to a communication using devices which already exist or 
are planned to be implemented, such as the 2.5G General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) 
(Michel and Ramasarma, 2005). The second class concerns signals sent to moving devices 
and which require the introduction of new solutions. For example, some dynamic information 
of the control centre may be sent onto the road user‟s GPS reception device. 
In-vehicle warning devices are the only viable ITS intervention at crossings that cannot be 
upgraded (due to cost), given that the only way for the system to provide dynamic 
information regarding the train would be to send a message to the vehicle. The most 
affordable solution is for trains to send the signal and communicate directly with cars close to 
the RLX, as this would avoid the high cost of upgrading passive RLXs to active ones, given 
that there are fewer trains than there are level crossings. The deployment of in-vehicle ITS 
technology at passive crossings would require either investments for trains or a centralised 
system to communicate with the vehicle, or the use of a mixed approach, combining 
dynamic information for already active crossings (through wireless communications) and 
static information at passive crossings. In-vehicle systems at active crossings would require 
the access (through wireless) to the information triggering the active controls. The crossing 
being active, this safety approach would complement already existing protections (active 
lights with or without boom gates). For both types of RLXs, this approach relies on market 
penetration (in terms of vehicles).  The issues of likelihood of rapid market penetration and 
efficiency in terms of safety benefits remain. Such issues might be addressed by targeting 
vehicles at risk, such as trucks, and using already widely distributed devices such as in-
vehicle GPS devices, PDAs and smartphones.   
Various wireless protection systems with in-vehicle warning are currently developed, 
including EV-Alert (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2004), Pulsed LED 
RLX Signals (National Research Council, 2001) , Intelligent Crossing Controller (IXC) 
(Tardif, 2004), Railway Crossing Collision Avoidance System (Ogden, 2007, Welk, 1999), 
Emergalert system (Forester et al., 1994), and the use of Data Radio System (DRS) protocol 
and global positioning system (GPS) (Ogden, 2007). Such systems, the EV-alert for 
instance, can be installed for a cost of the order of $50,000 (Tey, 2009). On-road-based 
interventions can also be considered for active crossings. Active crossings, particularly those 
without boom gates, are of considerable concern in terms of safety. New approaches can 
complement current primary controls and should not be very expensive to implement (the 
expensive train detection system being already available at the crossing). An example of 
such approach is the trial of the valet system (on-road flashing markers) proposed by 
Queensland Rail. 
Methodology to assess safety effects of future Intelligent Transport Systems on railway level 
crossings  
 
5 
4. HMI design of the ITS interventions 
The technologies presented in the previous section have the potential to increase driver 
awareness at RLXs, using either in-vehicle or on-road warnings. Independently of the 
technology selected (through evaluation of reliability and cost), it is possible to provide new 
information to drivers that will increase their awareness at crossings through Human 
Machine Interface (HMI). With driver error being the main contributing factor to crashes at 
RLXs, it is important to assess whether driver behaviour will improve at RLXs with such HMI, 
whether new messages will have negative effects on their attention on the road and whether 
drivers would accept the new information provided to them. Requirements for the 
development of a HMI to increase driver awareness at RLXs is discussed in the following 
sections. 
4.1. Human factors good practice at railway crossings 
The Rail Safety and Standards Board‟s report (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2011) 
highlighted the requirements for improving signals at railway crossings. Such requirements 
need to be used for any potential ITS device‟s HMI as well. Therefore: 
 Using an ITS device and its HMI should not increase the cognitive load on the driver 
in a detrimental way, as the driver needs sufficient resources to collect and analyse 
information from the crossing and react appropriately if required. Therefore, any 
system which would increase driver cognitive load should be avoided. 
 The salience of the crossing should be enhanced. 
 Poor decision making from the driver should be reduced by preparing the road user 
for the need to attend to potential hazards. 
 Sightlines should be improved in order to provide more time to the driver to make 
appropriate decisions at a crossing (a negative effect of this measure is the tendency 
of drivers to drive faster when approaching the crossing and this should be 
addressed). Using an ITS is a completely different approach but has the potential to 
provide the same benefits (and side effects) as the improvement of sightlines. 
In relation to emerging technologies, Edquist, Stephan, & Wigglesworth (2009) suggest that 
human factors principles must be considered, so that warning systems reduce the cognitive 
and attentional load of the driver and safeguard against mental overload and distraction. 
Since vision and hearing are by far the senses of most relevance to driving, the choice of 
display modalities is generally limited to them (SELCAT, 2008). The choice of which of the 
two to use depends on a variety of factors. Visual form is preferred when the message is 
long and complex or deals with spatial references, no immediate action is needed, the 
message needs to be referred to later, or when hearing is difficult. Audible form is preferred 
when the message is short and simple, immediate action is needed, the message deals with 
events in time, or when vision is difficult (SELCAT, 2008). 
4.2. Visual and audio HMI 
Driving is primarily a visual task, and therefore safe driving largely relies on the human visual 
system. The human visual field is constrained by the direction in which one directs one's 
gaze. This restricts the awareness of hazards outside one's visual field. On the other hand, 
one is able to hear sounds regardless of the direction from which the sound is coming, but a 
noisy environment can reduce the effects of an audio warning. This makes sound a 
particularly useful medium for conveying safety critical messages (Sanders and McCormick, 
1993). Visual and audio are therefore the HMIs most used in the driving context. 
Visual HMIs are numerous in driving literature and are often robust. The characteristics of 
the successful visual HMIs in improving drivers‟ perception and decision making are: 
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symbolic representations rather than text, maximised contrast and position within an 10 
degree area around the line of sight of the driver (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2011). 
Also, visual HMI should be designed to ensure that the visual load is controlled. Otherwise, 
drivers tend to look less at the road centre area ahead, and instead look at the display area 
more often, for longer periods and for more varied durations (Engström et al., 2005).  
Audio HMIs can be used in two different ways. Warning sounds can be used (abstract 
sounds such as „beeps‟, auditory icons highly correlated to the event the warning is trying to 
highlight) or audio messages can be given to drivers.  Speech-based warnings or auditory 
icons can improve comprehension. Although the evidence from the research is not 
consistent, there is some indication that meaningful sounds such as speech or auditory icons 
result in faster reaction times (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2011). Effective audio 
signals are characterised by: a frequency and volume very different to ambient noise, a 
signal lasting more than 500ms, and a source of the sound in the same direction as the 
hazard (Ho and Spence, 2005). There is a maximum number of auditory signals which can 
be used (Weiss and Kershner, 1985). Twelve distinct warning sounds can be discriminated 
by trained operators on a relative basis, and only five if absolute identification is required. 
The advantage of using an audio warning is that drivers do not remove their eyes from the 
road as they process the information provided to them (Engström et al., 2005). 
4.3. Vibro-tactile HMI 
Another type of HMI can be used for ITS interventions, whether in-vehicle or on-road. Vibro-
tactile cues (vibrations) can be given to the driver to attract their attention. For instance, it 
has been shown on a driving simulator that drivers can respond to a hazard on the road 25% 
faster with a vibro-tactile warning and manage to stop 34% further away from an object on 
the road (Ho et al., 2006). Nevertheless, such HMI faces two main issues. First, the warning 
has no iconic meaning and cannot be used to give precise information to the driver, which is 
an issue since ITS systems would provide a range of warning signals (not only for RLXs). 
Secondly, such methodology only has general spatial alerting abilities (Brown et al., 2005). 
Also, the research is scarce on the appropriate level of vibration to alert drivers with such 
HMI to cover the range of individual sensitivity to such vibrations (Rail Safety and Standards 
Board, 2011). 
4.4. Combinations of HMIs 
The previously described types of HMI can be combined to provide a range of cues to the 
driver about the same event. The most common combination is the use of both audio and 
visual signals. This generally improves the time required to respond to a stimulus as 
compared to a uni-modal warning (Ho et al., 2007). Such improvement is likely to be 
observed when both stimuli are presented from approximately the same spatial location at 
approximately the same time (Stein and Meredith, 1993, Stevenson et al., 2007). Such 
positive effects disappear when, for instance, an auditory cue positioned to the left or right is 
paired with a central tactile cue rather than with a tactile cue coming from the same direction 
as the auditory cue  (Ho et al., 2009). 
Unfortunately, in many situations the reaction time improvement resulting from multisensory 
warnings is likely to be small (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2011), particularly in realistic 
environments, where warnings targeting multiples senses are likely to be given to drivers 
with some delay due to the need to combine multiple sensors (Brown et al., 2001). In the 
study by Lee, McGehee, Brown, & Marshall (2006), the warning signals were triggered by 
realistic algorithms and such experiments did not succeed in providing any advantage in 
terms of reaction times, although it was comparing the combination of visual, auditory, seat 
vibration, and brake pulse cues with uni-modal cues.  
Therefore, uni-modal audio or visual warning should be preferred for providing information 
with new ITS technologies targeting RLXs. 
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5. Proposed methodology for evaluating effects of new ITS 
interventions at RLXs 
Both potential positive and negative effects on safety of new ITS interventions for RLXs need 
to be assessed. A safe and controlled environment is required for conducting first trials of 
such new technologies with drivers. Using driving simulation provides safe conditions, a 
controlled environment, and repeatable and realistic driving conditions. Such equipment 
facilitates case control, before and after studies, and can be used to compare the effects of 
ITS interventions to current signals at RLXs. Finally, driving simulation allows quick and 
inexpensive ways to test many non-existent road safety interventions for railway crossings 
before trialling the most promising at a real RLX. 
This project focuses on the HMI aspects of the technology and does not intend to build the 
hardware itself. It assumes that hardware conveys the required information reliably. It 
implements the interfaces with the highest potential to increase safety at RLXs. The HMI will 
only warn the driver that he has to stop at the crossing, either because a train is approaching 
or because the driver could not cross the railway safely. A mock-up of the most suitable 
technology will be simulated and tested in an advanced driving simulator.  
Variables measured during the driving task can be measured with high reliability and high 
frequency, which enables measurement of driver behaviour in a very comprehensive way 
compared to on-road driving. The driving simulator provides all information about the car 
dynamics and environment, while appropriate sensors can provide information about driver 
behaviour and workload whilst performing the driving task. This provides a comprehensive 
picture of what is happening when the driver arrives at a RLX. 
Different HMIs were considered to provide a warning to drivers, and the choice of which 
three HMIs to trial was formed by both literature review (see section 4) and consultation with 
focus groups of Queensland drivers. The effects on safety of these interventions will be 
compared to a baseline which presents only traditional warnings at crossings (no ITS 
intervention).  
Another parameter of interest in this project is visibility when arriving at a crossing. A lack of 
visibility of the crossing can reduce the time the driver has to make a decision when arriving 
at the crossing. UK data, as reported by RSSB (2011), shows that the contributing factors to 
crashes at railway level crossings are often related to low visibility (for instance due to 
sunlight or turns in the road) or late braking decisions from the driver. While Ward and Wilde 
(1996) suggest that visibility would not significantly affect driver behaviour as drivers tend to 
maintain their safety margin regardless of improvement of visibility, it is of interest to 
evaluate whether ITS interventions improve behaviour at both active and passive crossings 
by providing information for safe decision making earlier. Indeed, ITS interventions enable 
drivers to be informed of the presence or absence of trains independently of the visibility of 
the crossing.  
ITS also has the potential to improve driver awareness of the blocking back issue and 
increase the likelihood of a safe decision when arriving at the crossing, as was observed 
with vehicle activated signs on the side of the road in the UK study by McKenzie-Kerr, et al. 
(2011). Nevertheless, these positive effects were short-term and, when possible, the best 
solution is to remove or reduce the likelihood of a queue to form. ITS interventions trialled in 
our study enable drivers to be informed of the potential blocking back at the crossing, even 
though the signal is not activated for a train.  
This proposed methodology for comprehensively assessing the effects of ITS interventions 
at RLXs will primarily assess the effects of such interventions on driver decisions and 
behaviour at railway crossings through the measurement of: compliance rates, driver 
awareness at the crossing (particularly eye tracking of the situation), driver perception of 
increased safety at the crossing with such systems, as well as driver acceptance of the 
Methodology to assess safety effects of future Intelligent Transport Systems on railway level 
crossings  
 
8 
system, speeding behaviour (particularly when the driver takes action to reduce speed when 
the situation „train is approaching‟ is identified) and driver workload and distraction when 
processing the information at the crossing. Such measurements are presented in the 
following sections. 
The research design is a 3 (ITS design: visual, audio HMIs and on-road intervention) x 2 
(visibility: low and high) x 2 (traffic at crossing: low and blocking back) repeated measures 
experimental design. A control condition is implemented to record baseline driving 
performance with no ITS intervention. Participants are exposed to only one type of ITS 
intervention. For each ITS intervention, 30 participants will be invited to participate in order to 
detect differences of large sized effects due to the technology with a .9 power (at α=.05). 
Repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA‟s) tests will be conducted for each 
measurements presented in the following section. 
5.1. Drivers situational awareness 
Driver‟s situational awareness can be accessed through both the driver‟s capacity to 
understand the situation and their performance and errors while driving (Durso and 
Sethumadhavan, 2008). As applied to railway crossings, performance and errors can be 
obtained by an analysis of the compliance rate and violation of the crossings (with train), an 
assessment of the safety of the speed when arriving at the crossing (with and without trains), 
and an assessment of reaction times when an active protection is activated or when a static 
sign is legible. The drivers‟ evaluation of the situation can be monitored through their eye 
gaze patterns as well as through questionnaires focused on driver‟s feedback about their 
situational awareness and their perception of safety at RLXs with and without assistance 
from ITS technology. 
5.2. Distraction 
The use of HMIs designed to assist in various driving situations is increasing (e.g., collision 
warning and avoidance, adaptive cruise control, lane departure, etc.). Although these 
systems are designed to benefit drivers, there are many instances where they can, and do, 
distract drivers from the primary task of driving. This is primarily due to the complexity 
involved, on the driver‟s behalf, in setting and monitoring the interface whilst driving. 
Therefore the effects of any new ITS interventions on driver distraction should be 
investigated. Such investigation will be done by analysing gaze patterns of the driver, which 
will provide information about their gaze fixations on signs at various crossings as well as of 
their gaze distraction from the road. The driver‟s control of the vehicle will also be monitored, 
through lane keeping for instance. 
5.3. Mental workload 
The effects of the technology on driver workload will be monitored with both physiological 
devices and subjective questionnaires. It has been shown that the physiological metric heart 
rate, if it changes at all, increases and the metric heart rate variability decreases during 
increased mental processing (Ahsberg et al., 2000, Oron-Gilad et al., 2008). The NASA-TLX 
will also be administered to participants in order to obtain their subjective assessment of the 
mental workload required for the drive (with or without the ITS). 
5.4. Acceptance of the technology 
After participants have used the ITS, their feedback about their acceptance of the technology 
will be collected via a questionnaire. This questionnaire is an adaptation of the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) combined with the questionnaires used by the focus group and will 
assess the ease of use and perceived usefulness of the three ITS interventions. 
Conclusion 
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Research within the Australian context has indicated that interventions are required to 
reduce the number of crashes at both active and passive railway crossings. New ITS 
systems can help realising this aim by reducing driver errors at level crossings. The overall 
aim of this project is to evaluate the changes in driver behaviour at the approach of railway 
crossings when using new ITS technologies. This paper has highlighted the requirements for 
such technologies, from rail regulators, rail industry and drivers. There are a number of 
potential technologies which could be trialled and the best technologies in terms of safety 
potential, cost, and acceptance from drivers should be further investigated. Independently of 
the chosen technology, human factors issues need to be taken into account while providing 
new information to drivers. A methodology was proposed in this paper to comprehensively 
evaluate new ITS interventions in terms of compliance, control of the vehicle, mental 
workload and acceptance from the driver. ITS interventions are likely to improve drivers‟ 
awareness of the crossing status in low visibility conditions as well as in high traffic 
conditions with a risk of blocking back. This methodology will be implemented on an 
advanced driving simulator in order to evaluate the effects of ITS interventions on these 
issues at RLXs. The three most promising HMIs – audio, visual in-vehicle interventions and 
on-road flashing markers – have been selected based on a review of the literature, a 
cost/benefit analysis and a focus group of Queensland drivers, and will be investigated and 
compared during this experiment. 
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